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NATURE OF THE CASE 
The district court entered an order that personal property 
of Utah Hay & Cattle Company (Utah Hay), a Utah corporation, be 
deemed abandoned. Utah Hay filed a complaint against Holt 
contesting the interpretation of a settlement agreement and an 
escrow agreement provided for in the settlement agreement which 
agreements pertained to the purchase of real property, a ranch. 
Some time later Holt merely filed a motion seeking removal of 
the personal property from the ranch or it be deemed abandoned. 
He never obtained service on Utah Hay and never sought leave of 
the court to amend his answer. The court entered Findings and 
an Order declaring Utah Hay's personal property abandoned. The 
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and the procedures 
declaring the personal property abandoned violated Utah Hay's 
constitutional and fundamental right to due process under the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. The District Court Lacked Jurisdiction to Enter the 
Order Declaring the Personal Property Abandoned and Therefore 
the Court's Order is Void. 
2. Utah Hay's Right to Due Process As Required By Both the 
U.S. Constitution and Utah Constitution was Violated Because 
Established Procedures Were Not Followed and Utah Hay Received 
No Notice. 
3. It was Error and Abuse of Discretion for the Court to 
Enter an Order Deeming the Property Abandoned Because no Intent 
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was Shown by Utah Hay to Relinquish its Property Interest and 
other Judicial Remedies were Available to the Court to Force the 
Removal of the Personal Property. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The District Court entered an order against Utah Hay on 
March 16, 1985. 
RELIEF REQUESTED 
Utah Hay seeks reversal of the final order entered by Judge 
Burns on March 16, 1985, and an order declaring that the 
District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Utah Hay relies on the following facts: 
1. Utah Hay filed a complaint against Robert Holt and 
others on December 30, 1983, seeking specific performance or in 
the alternative damages based on "a written agreement with the 
Defendants to purchase certain real property". (See paragraph 4 
of the Complaint). The real property is a ranch in Iron County, 
Utah. 
2. On January 9, 1984, Utah Hay filed an amended complaint 
adding other factual allegations and a cause of action based on 
estoppel but still seeking specific performance or in the 
alternative damages. 
-3-
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3. On February 7, 1984, defendants Robert Holt and 
Escalante Farms, Co., (collectively referred to as "Holt") 
answered the amended complaint. With the answer Holt filed no 
counterclaim, 
4. On April 16, 1984, Mr. Wright, plaintiffs1 attorney, 
filed a Motion to Withdraw. 
5. By minute entry dated May 2, 1984, the Court granted the 
Motion to Withdraw. 
6. On July 10, 1984, Holt filed a Motion for Plaintiffs to 
Remove Personal Property or For Declaration that the same be 
abandoned to Defendants. Mr. Holt filed an affidavit with an 
exhibit listing at least thirty-seven pieces of equipment and 
other items comprising the personal property Utah Hay had 
purchased from the Bekins Bar V Estate. (See Exhibit 2 to 
Holt1s Affidavit). 
7. The motion was not mailed to Mr. Wright, Utah Hay's 
former counsel. 
8. The notice of hearing was filed on August 16, 1984, 
setting the hearing for Holt's Motion for Removal on September 
5, 1984. 
9. The file shows that service on Utah Hay was attempted by 
certified mail but that the mailing was returned undelivered. 
(See the minute entry dated September 5, 1984.) 
10. According to a minute entry dated September 10, 1984, 
Mr. Fain appeared and the matter was passed. 
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11. On November 17f 1984, the Court signed an Order 
requiring removal of the personal property within thirty days or 
the personal property be deemed abandoned based on the hearing 
of September 5, 1984r granting Holt's motion. On December 5/ 
1984, Utah Hay was personally served with the Order. 
12. Utah Hay initiated steps to have the court stay the 
enforcement of its Order. 
13. On March 25, 1985, the court denied Utah Hay's stay and 
entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law which reaffirmed 
the removal or abandonment order. (See paragraph 10 of the 
order dated March 25f 1985.). 
In summary, Utah Hay filed a complaint regarding a purchase 
of real property, a ranch, and Holt answered. Five months later 
Holt without leave of the court filed a motion, not an amended 
answer with a counterclaim. The motion requested the court to 
enter an order requiring Utah Hay to remove personal property or 
it be deemed abandoned. The personal property was not related 
to the issues in the complaint. Although service was attempted, 
the record shows the letter to Utah Hay was returned 
undelivered. No proper pleading exists which provides a basis 
for jurisdiction as to the personal property. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The district court lacked jurisdiction. To commence a 
separate and distinct claim for relief Holt filed a motion 
requesting an order that Utah Hay remove certain personal 
'."•' - 5 -
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property from Holt1s ranch or it be deemed abandoned to Holt 
legal precedents require that to invoke jurisdiction recognized 
legal procedures must be followed. The Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure establish the legal procedures to be followed to state 
a claim and to invoke a court's jurisdiction. A motion can not 
invoke jurisdiction. Without jurisdiction all actions of the 
district court and especially the order dated March 16, 1985, 
are null and void. 
2. Due process under both the U.S. Constitution and the 
Utah Constitution requires that the established legal procedures 
be followed. In the instant matter a motion was filed in an 
attempt to put before the district court a separate and distinct 
cause of action. The district court acted in response to the 
motion and thereby failed to follow the established rules. 
Further, the record shows that Utah Hay received no notice of 
Holt's motion to remove or abandon motion. Due process requires 
an interested party receive notice and have the opportunity to 
be heard. 
3. The district court's order declaring the numerous items 
of equipment and personal property abandoned was error. A 
requisite element of abandoned property is intent of the owner 
to relinquish the property right or interest. No facts are 
present in the record to establish Utah Hay's intent to 
relinquish its interest. Further, declaring the property 
abandoned was an abuse of judicial discretion. The district 
court had other remedies available, such as, assessing Utah 
-6-
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Hay for any damages Holt suffered or commencing a contempt 
proceeding against Utah Hay to compel action. In declaring the 
property abandoned the court abused its discretion. 
Argument I. 
THE DISTRICT COURT 
LACKED JURISDICTION 
TO ENTER THE ORDER 
DECLARING THE PERSONAL 
PROPERTY ABANDONED AND 
THEREFORE THE COURT'S 
ORDER IS VOID 
To act a court must have jurisdiction. If a court acts 
without jurisdiction its actions are null and void. 
The Supreme Court has addressed the issue of when 
jurisdiction attaches. In Muskrat v. U.S. 219 U.S. 346, 
31.S.Ct. 250, 55 L.Ed. 246 (1911) the Supreme Court was 
confronted with the issue of whether a "case" or "controversy" 
existed. At 356 the Court defined "case" as follows: 
A "case" was defined by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall as 
early as the leading case of Marberry v. Madison, 1 
Cranen, 137, to be a suit instituted according to the 
regular course of judicial procedure. 
Thus, to have a case, a suit must be filed according to 
established procedures. In the same case at 361 the court 
referred to judicial power as the right to determine actual 
controversies "duly instituted" between adverse parties. In 
other words before any court has a case or controversy proper 
judicial procedures must be followed to trigger jurisdiction. 
-7-
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The Supreme Court of Florida addressed the issue as to 
whether a party was properly before the court and whether a 
default judgment had been properly entered in Roberts v. 
Seaboard Surety Co., 29 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 1947). At page 749 the 
court 
stated the following: 
There must be some appropriate application invoking the 
judicial power of the court in respect to the matter 
sought to be litigated; such as the filing of a 
petition, complaint or other proper pleading, for it is 
in this manner that the court's power over the subject 
matter is invoked. 
To obtain jurisdiction over the subject matter a proper pleading 
must be filed. 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (URCP) embody the 
established judicial procedures that must be followed to invoke 
jurisdiction. 
Rule 8(a) of the URCP defines a "claim for relief" as 
follows: 
(a) Claims for Relief. 
A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether 
an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or 
third-party claim, shall contain (1) a short and plain 
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 
entitled to relief; and (2) a demand for judgment for 
the relief to which he deems himself entitled. Relief 
in the alternative or of several different types may be 
demanded. 
In short, if a party makes a claim for relief he must state the 
factual basis for the claim and he must make a demand for the 
relief sought in a pleading. Included in Rule 8(a) within the 
scope of a pleading is a counterclaim, a cross-claim or a 
third-party claim. 
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Rule 7(a) of the URCP also discusses pleadings. It states 
as follows: 
(a) Pleadings. 
There shall be a complaint and an answer; a reply to a 
counterclaim denominated as such; an answer to a 
cross-claim, if the answer contains a cross-claim; a 
third party complaint, if a person who was not an 
original party is summoned under the provisions of Rule 
14; and a third-party answer, if a third-party 
complaint is served. No other pleading shall be 
allowed, except that the court may order a reply to an 
answer or a third-party answer. 
Under this rule a pleading must be a complaint, answer, reply to 
a counterclaim, answer to cross-claim, third-party complaint and 
third-party answer. Rule 7(a) with limited exceptions not 
applicable here further provides that no other pleadings are 
allowed. 
To invoke jurisdiction in accordance with the URCP one of 
the forms of pleadings must be filed. Rules 7 and 8 provide for 
no other pleadings to initiate properly a claim for relief. A 
proper pleading under the rules must be filed to invoke the 
jurisdiction of the court. 
A court has no discretion as to whether or not to follow the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. It is duly bound and has a firm, 
unequivoial obligation to follow the rules. (See Rule 1 of the 
URCP). 
By filing a motion Holt attempted to invoke the jurisdiction 
of the court to grant him relief for his claim. Under the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure a motion is not included among the 
definitions of a pleading and a pleading must be filed to invoke 
the jurisdiction of the court. 
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It matters not that the parties were before the court on 
another matter. (Here the other matter involved contractual 
rights in a real property transaction). To invoke the 
jurisdiction of the court on a separate and distinct claim Holt 
wished to assert against the plaintiff, Utah Hay, Holt had to 
file a recognized form of a pleading. Holt's failure to place 
his claim properly before the court left the court with no 
jurisdiction. With no jurisdiction over the subject matter the 
court's order is null and void. 
Even if the court might deem Holt's motion to be a 
permissive counterclaim under Rule 13(b), Holt had filed his 
answer five months before the filing of the motion and under 
Rule 15(a) a party may amend a pleading only by leave of the 
court. The record shows that Holt sought no leave of the court 
and the court granted none. Also, a supplemental pleading under 
Rule 15(d) is allowed only upon motion and reasonable notice, 
neither of which exists in the record. 
Also, Holt's motion related to the personal property of Utah 
Hay. Utah Hay's complaint against Holt pertained to a contract 
involving real property. Holt's motion sought removal of the 
property or an order deeming the property abandoned. Utah Hay's 
complaint sought specific performance under the contract or 
damages. Thus, Holt's motion attempted to place claims before 
the court for resolution totally unrelated and separate and 
distinct from the issues already before the court. Holt's 
-10-
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motion embodied a separate claim and therefore needs an 
independent basis for jurisdiction. It is possible that 
jurisdiction for Holt's claim could have been accomplished if 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure had been followed. Without 
following the Rules, Holt's motion is spurious and the district 
court's actions based solely on Holt's motion are also spurious. 
Holt's motion failed to place his claim properly before the 
court and left the district court with no jurisdiction over the 
personal property. 
The order of March 16, 1985, is null and void because the 
district court lacked jurisdiction. 
II. 
UTAH HAY'S RIGHT TO 
DUE PROCESS 
AS REQUIRED BY BOTH THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 
AND UTAH CONSTITUTION WAS 
VIOLATED BECAUSE ESTABLISHED 
PROCEDURES WERE NOT FOLLOWED AND 
UTAH HAY RECEIVED NO NOTICE 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and the 
Section 7 of Article One of the Utah Constitution provide for 
due process. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment in pertinent 
part states: "...nor shall any state deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property without due process of law,..." The 
Utah Constitution states: "No person shall be deprived of life, 
liberty or property, without due process of law." Article One, 
Section 7, Utah Constitution. 
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The U.S. Supreme Court in construing the meaning of due 
process stated the following: 
By "due process of law" is meant one whichf following 
the forms of law, is appropriate to the case, and just 
to the parties affected. It must be pursued in the 
ordinary mode prescribed by the law; ... 
Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. No. 108, Cal. Ill U.S. 701, 
708; 4. S.Ct. 663; 28 L.Ed. 569; (1884). 
In Lloyd v. Third Judicial District, 495 P2d. 1262 (Utah 
1972), plaintiffs who were impecunious wives sought to 
accomplish service of process by mailing the appropriate 
pleadings to the last known address of the husband. The Utah 
Supreme Court held that the mailing constituted an abridgment of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and thus violated due process. 
The prior argument of this brief established that in the 
instant matter the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure were not 
followed. Failure to follow the established rules constitutes a 
violation of due process. Therefore, the District Court's Order 
was unconstitutional. 
An integral part of due process is notice. The record shows 
that the attempted service on or notice to Utah Hay by certified 
mail was not accomplished. The record included the certified 
mailing returned undelivered. After the court signed the 
order requiring Utah Hay to remove numerous items of personal 
property during the dead of winter and within a thirty day 
period which included the holiday season, it required personal 
service. This sequence of events is a paradox. When finally 
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served on December 5, 1984, Utah Hay was presented with a fait 
accompli and had no opportunity to present factual or legal 
arguments to counter Holt's claim. The district court had 
acted. 
Fairness did not underly this sequence of events. Without 
notice and the lack of compliance with the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Utah Hay's right to due process was violated. The 
Court's order requiring removal or deeming the property 
abandoned violated due process and is unconstitutional. 
III. 
IT WAS ERROR AND AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
FOR THE COURT TO ENTER AN ORDER DEEMING THE PROPERTY 
ABANDONED BECAUSE NO INTENT 
WAS SHOWN BY UTAH HAY TO 
RELINQUISH ITS PROPERTY INTEREST 
AND OTHER JUDICIAL REMEDIES 
WERE AVAILABLE TO THE COURT 
TO FORCE THE REMOVAL OF THE PERSONAL PROPERTY 
The legal concept of abandoned property is well-established 
and includes intent as one of its elements. In Jackson v. 
Steinberg, 200 P.2d 376 (Or. 1948), the court defined abandoned 
property at 377: 
Abandoned property is that of which the owner has 
relinquished all right, title, claim, and possession, 
with the intention of not reclaiming it or resuming its 
ownership, possession or enjoyment. 
See In re: Manse Spring and Its Tribrituares, Nye County, 
108 P.2d 311 at 315 (Nevada 1940), Karageris v. Karageris, 302 
P.2d 850 at 852, 145 C.A. 2d 556 (Cal. 1956). Intent is an 
essential element of the legal concept of abandoned property. 
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The record in this manner is void of any facts demonstrating 
the intent of Utah Hay to abandon its numerous items of personal 
property. Without a showing of Utah Hay's intent to abandon its 
property the district court's order is erroneous and is contrary 
to the legal elements comprising abandonment. 
Also, in declaring an abandonment the district court totally 
and completely abrogated the property rights of Utah Hay: The 
district court abused its discretion. Judicial discretion has 
been defined by the Supreme Court of Minnesota courts as 
follows: 
Judicial discretion is the sound choosing by the court/ 
subject to the guidance of the lawf between doing or 
not doing a thing, the doing of which cannot be 
demanded as an absolute right of the party who asks 
that it be done. Chapman v. Dorsey, 41 N.W.2d 438 at 
442 (Minn. 1950). 
The United States Supreme Court has also discussed 
discretion in Langes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531, 51 S.Ct. 243, 75 
L.Ed. 520 (1931) as follows: 
The term "discretion" denotes the absence of a hard and 
fast rule. The Styria v. Morgan, 186 U.S. 1, 9. When 
invoked as a guide to judicial action it means a sound 
discretion, that is to say, a discretion exercised not 
arbitrarily or wilfully, but with regard to what is 
right and equitable under the circumstances and the 
law, and directed by the reason and conscience of the 
judge to a just result. (at 541). 
In exercising its discretion where no firmly established rules 
exist, a court is charged with the responsibility of reaching a 
fair result. 
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In the instant matter there is no established remedy for the 
failure of an owner to remove its property from the premises of 
another. The district court's remedy of abandonment was unfair 
and inequitable. Mr. Holt's claim was that the personal 
property caused interuption to his normal ranching operations. 
Yet Mr. Holt's concerns when balanced against the total loss of 
Utah Hay's property right are clearly outweighed. 
The district court had other remedial sanctions available 
such as, compensation to Holt for any damages shown or 
reasonable costs or rental value or a contempt proceeding 
against Utah Hay for failure to comply with the removal order. 
These practical and workable alternatives the district court 
ignored. 
The district court's order deeming the personal property 
abandoned was error because no intent to abandon is present. 
The order was an abuse of judicial power and contrary to 
well-establsihed principles concerning the just exercise of 
judicial authority. 
Conclusion 
Based on the foregoing the Order of the District Court dated 
March 16, 1985, should be reversed and this Court should enter 
an order declaring that the District Court lacked jurisdiction. 
DATED this JjL- day of November, 1985. 
Respectfully Submitted. 
jk 
WALLACE T. BOYACK 
Attorney for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated March 16, 
1985. 
Order showing service on December 5, 1984, 
Motion for Plaintiffs to Remove Personal Property or For 
Declaration that the Same be Abandoned to Defendants filed 
July 10, 1984. 
Answer of Robert Holt filed February 7, 1984. 
Amended Complaint filed January 10, 198 4. 
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5H9p 
THOMPSON, HUGHES & REBER ^ //v 
Michael D. Hughes ^ Y 
Attorney for Defendant & 
148 East Tabernacle 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Telephone: 801/673-4892 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UT7JI 
SUNSTAR DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, ) 
INC., a Nevada Corporation, 
and UTAH HAY AND CATTLE ) FINDINGS OF FACT 
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation, AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
; • > • - . 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. ) 
ROBERT HOLT, et al. ) 
Defendants. ) Civil No. 10345 
The Plaintiffs1 Motion for Stay of Proceedings to 
Enforce a Judgment filed pursuant to Rules 60 and 62 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure came before the Court on the 
13th day of March, 1985. And the Court, having viewed the 
files and reviewed' the Defendants objection to Plaintiffs' 
objection and being fully apprised of the premises, hereby 
enters the following Findings of Fact and Order: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Plaintiffs' motion seeks a "Stay of 
Execution" on an Order executed November 17th, 1984 by this 
Court. 
2. Said Order executed November 17th, 10P4 was to 
hr iv.-rved on the Plaintiffs and required Plaintiffs to Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
remove certain personal property from the Defendant's 
property within thirty (30) days, or alternatively, to be 
held to have abandoned his interest in such personal 
property. 
3. As required by this Court, this Order executed 
November 17th, 1984 was served on the moving party on 
December 5th, 1984. There was neither a motion for a new 
trial or for an amendment of this Cider filed within ten 
(10) days of service pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
4. The Ord~r itself is Leif-effecting, to-wit, 
the Order requires no further enforcement in order to In-
effective and to vest title to the personal property, 
referenced therein, to the Defendant. 
5. The Plaintiffs' main objections to the Order 
are two-fold. First, that this Court is stayed by bankruptcy 
proceedings from entering such and order and, secondly, that 
the entry of such an order was otherwise inequitable unck.-r 
the premises. 
6. Upon an examination cf the file, +
 4.t Court 
finds that the personal property abandoned to the Defendants 
was ordered sold by the Honorable Glen F. Clark in the first 
bankruptcy of Bekins Bar V. Ranch Corporation on the 20th of 
October, 1983. 
7. In reference to the automatic stay m the 
Eeki.-.t- }\»r V. Ranch bankruptcy :rilec; in the Centra] Division 
of the District of Utah. t-hiQ Cnur-*- fin*?* ~~ ±u~ w-.^ ;« ~x 
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n 1^  
the documentar}' evidence, that the Honorable John H. Allen 
executed an order on the 10th day of January, 1982 
specifically stating that the automatic stay of the 
bankruptcy court was no longer in effect. 
8. This Court further finds that the personal 
property was ordered removed from Defendants1 real property 
no later than February 10th# 1984 by the Honorable Clen E. 
Clark. 
9. Subsequent thereto, on the basis of 
documentary evidence, the Honorable Judge Eckart Thompson, 
sitting as the bankruptcy judge for the Eastern District of 
California, liited the automatic stay with respect to the 
personal property on the 19th day of hpril, 1984 and indeed, 
ordered that any livestock left by the Plaintiffs on that 
date be deemed abandoned automatically to the Defendants. 
10. As there was no stay order in existence in 
reference to the personal property, this Court finds its 
order executed un November 17th, 1984 and serve J c r. the 
Plaintiffs on December 5th, 1984 requiring the personal 
property to be removed in thirty (30) days or to be deemoa 
vacated and abandoned, to be within its jurisdiction and not 
stayed by the bankruptcy proceedings. 
11. The files before the Court indicate that the 
order was served upon Plaintiffs on December 5th, 19R'l, and 
as of this date, Defendant's motion to stay the effect of 
the order dated November 17th, war not fiicc for a mont; 
thereafter with this Court. 
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tat to 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
BASED UPON the foregoing Findings oi: Fact nnd the 
evidence shown in the file, the Court concludes as follows: 
1. There was no automatic stay in effect; 
precluding this Court from issuing its order in reference to 
the personal property which was the subject matter herein. 
2. That the Plaintiffs1 motion that the issue of 
the personal property's abandonment be reopened at this time 
should be denied. 
//tit 
DATED this /& day of March, 1985. 
5. HARLAN BURNS 
District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 14th day of March, 1985 I did 
wail a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to Scott A. Gubler, 
attorney for Plaintiff, at 205 East Tabernacle, St. George, 
Utah 84770, postage.prepaid. 
'•Vv/^/y'-N^i^/l?^^^ > 
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THOMPSON, HUGHES & RE3ER 
Michael D. Hughes 
Attorney for Defendant 
148 East Tabernacle 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Telephone: 801 /6"73-489? 
IK THE DISTRICT COURT OF IRON COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
SUNSTAR DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, 
INC., a Nevada Corporation, 
and UTAH HAY ANII CATTLE 
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ROBERT HOLT, et al. 
*&^:=£5W&&&&+&&%f endant s . 
ORDER TC 
REMOVE PERSONAL 
PROPERTY OR ALTERNATIVELY 
THAT THE FAKE BE 
ABANDONED TO DEFENDANTS 
Civil No. 10345 
The Plaintiffs' motion for Defendants vo move 
their personal property, or for declaration that the same ke 
abandoned to Defendants, came on for hearing on the ^th G?.\> 
of September, 1984. The Defendants being represented by 
their attorney, Michael D. Hughes, and the rtaintif f L>, 
though being notified, failing to appear either in person or 
through appointed counsel, and the court havinr reviewed the 
motion of the Defendants and the affadavit of Pobort Holt 
thereof and there being no contrary affadavit being filed in 
i 
opposition thereto and the court being fully apprised of the 
premises, the court having entered its findings of fact ana 
conclusions of law hereby orders as follows: 
0/-T. JjQs^.^1 TI:- I4'c2rv-
; j i ; ~J±.££^±Jtlz\SLjO:iZL 
•SEITITEJS
 ;\ELE JMliiAY Pr.dC l-.L 00'JHTY. ITAr 
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****** JfcZLc 
1» That the personal property of the Plaintiffs be 
removed at a time convenient to both the Plaintiffs and the 
Defendants in this case. Such time to be arranged by the 
Plaintiffs by direct contact with Robert Holt, and or his 
attorney, within thirty days. That in the event that such 
personal property is not removed, that the same be 
thereafter be deemed vacated and abandoned to the interests 
of the Defendants. 
2. That the Lis Pendens filed her^iiyis null and 
void and has no effect at law or in equity. ^ A -"// //^VU*> 
IkHmi r„ HfrL 
! q i
 - / 
/ 
/ / y 
! f / if 
/fjfMtptiV'k'1' 
3. HARLAN BURNS 
D i s t r i c t C o u i t Jud<je 
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THOMPSON, HUGHES & REBER \: • •<• . , ^••: 7.;->f '^ '' 
Michael D. Hughes V. ^ S ^ O P ^ ^ 
Attorney for Defendants "^-—^ • ''" 
148 East Tabernacle 
St. George, UT 84770 
Telephone: 801/673-4 892 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SUNSTAR DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, ) 
INC., a Nevada Corporation, 
and UTAH HAY AND CATTLE ) MOTION FOP PLAINTIFFS TO 
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation, REMOVE PERSONAL PROPER!Y 
) OR FOR DECLARATION THAT 
Plaintiffs, THE SAME BE ABANDONED TO 
) DEFENDANTS vs. 
ROBERT HOLT, et al. " ] • • • " " • • • - " - . 
• • • : ' : - » ' : " ' . - ' 
Defendants. ) Civil No. 10345 
COME NOW the Defendants above-named and hereby 
move the Court for an order requiring Plaintiffs to remove 
the personal property previously purchased by Defendants 
from Bekins Bar V Ranch, the same being situate upon the 
premises owned by Defendant in the above-entitled action. 
Defendants further move for an order requiring that the 
Notice of Lis Pendens be cancelled, and that in the event: 
said personal property is not removed within thirty days of 
a court order issued in accordance with this motion, that 
the same be declared abandoned to the interests of the 
Defendants. 
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DATED t h i s day of J u l y , 198 4 
• i / V j ^ 1 * • *-' i'UJOf 9^ " ' *•* fc^V, 
MICHAEL D.^HUGHESA 
Attorney for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING ^ 
I hereby certify that on the ; .,'.,/. day of July, 
1984, I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing MOTION FOR PLAINTIFFS TO REMOVE PERSONAL PROPERTY 
OR FOR DECLARATION TliAT THE SAME BE ABANDONED TO DEFENDANTS 
to Sunstar Development Company, Inc., at ?05 No. Carson 
Street, Carson City, Nevada, 89701, to Utah Hay and Cattlo 
Company, c/o James Fain, at 7601 Ribier Avenue, LaMont, 
California, 93201, and to Douglas Furth at 800 Continental 
Bank Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, postage prepaid. 
.SECRETARY 
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"ft. IJf 
Douglas L. Furth 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, 
A Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Defendants 
800 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 531-8900 
•^m 
•yK&' 
IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF IRON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SUNSTAR DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, 
INC., a Nevada corporation, and 




ROBERT HOLT, C. STANLEY HUTH, 
ESCALANTE FARMS, CO., POBERT HOLT, 




Civil No. 10345 
Defendants Robert Holt and Escalante Farms, Co. answer 
plaintiffs1 complaint as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs' complaint fails to state grounds upon which 
relief can be granted. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
Defendants answer plaintiffs' specific allegations as 
follows: 
1. Deny paragraph 1 for lack of information. 
LAW OFFICES 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
A PROFESSIONAL. CO«H»0«ATIOK< 
EtGMTH FLOOR CONTINENTAL BANK BUILDING 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84101 
V 
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2. Admit paragraph 2. 
3. Defendants deny paragraph 3. 
4. Defendants admit that it entered into an agreement 
with plaintiffs wherein plaintiffs could purchase certain real 
property described as Bekins Bar-V Ranch if the sum of $2,125,000 
were paid on or before 10:00 a.m. on December 23, 1983. 
Defendants admit that the legal description attached hereto as 
Exhibits "A" and HB" is correct. 
5. Defendants deny paragraph 5. 
6. Defendants admit paragraph 6. 
7. Defendants admit paragraph 7. 
8/ Defendants deny paragraph 8. 
9. Defendants deny paragraph 9. 
10. Defendants deny paragraph 10. 
11. Defendants deny paragraph 11. 
12. Defendants deny paragraph 12. 
13. Defendants answer paragraph 13 as it answered 
paragraphs 1 through 12. 
14. Defendants deny paragraph 14. 
15. Defendants deny paragraph 15. 
16. Defendants deny paragraph 16. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
Plaintiff could have and should have raised these claims 
in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah and 






FABIAN & C L E N D E N I N 
AI»*t0^t»$IONALCOH» ,OHA1i«. iN 
EIGHTH FLOOR CONTINENTAL BANK BUILDING 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 64101 
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FOURTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiff's claims are barred by the Utah Statute of 
Frauds, Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1 (1953 as amended). 
DATED this i-?frVday of January, 1984. 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, 
A Professional Corporation 
j q l a s L. Zr i t f th Doug! 
Attorneys Jtfir Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I personally mailed a copy of the 
foregoing Motion for Summary Judgment on this *-/ day of 
January, 1984, by U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
J. MacArthur Wright 
ATKIN, WRIGHT & MILES 
P.O. Box 339 
St. George, Utah 84770 
i& g&**n« s/'n-J' 
- 3 -
LAW OFFICES 
FABIAN Bt C L E N D E N I N 
A PWOrC»»IOM*L C O M O h » l l O N 
EIGHT H 1^  LOOM CONTINENTAL UANK BUil.DtNC 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 841C" 
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ATKIN, WRIGHT & MILES 
By J. MacArthur Wright 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
60 North 300 East 
P. 0. Box 339 
St. George, UT 84770 
Phone: 628-2612 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF IRON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SUNSTAR DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, ) 
INC., a Nevada corporation; 
and UTAH HAY AND CATTLE COMPANY,) AMFNDFD COMPLAINT 
A Utah corporation, 
) . 
Plaintiffs, 
. ) • 
vs. 
) Civil No. 
ROBERT HOLT , C. STANLEY 
HUTH, and ESCALANTF FARMS, CO., 
ROBERT HOLT, GENERAL PARTNER,_ 
A Utah partnership. ) 
Defendants. ) 
COME NOW Plaintiffs and for a cause of action alleae a^ 
follows: 
1. Plaintiff, Sunstar Development Company, Inc., is a 
Nevada Corporation and Plaintiff, Utah Hay and Cattle C01r.pn.n3>, is 
a Utah Corporation with its principal place of business in Iron 
County, State of Utah. 
2. Defendant, Robert Holt, is a resident of Washington 
County, State of Utah; Defendant, C. Stanley Huth, on information 
and belief, is a resident of the State of California; and 
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3. That the acts complained of hereinafter were 
performed in the County of Iron, State of Utah. 
4. Plaintiff# Sunstar Development Company, Inc. and 
Plaintiff, Utah Hay and Cattle Company, entered into a written 
agreement with the Defendants to purchase certain real property 
sometimes referred to hereinafter as the "Bekins Bar V Ranch," or 
simply "Bar V Ranch/* located in Iron County, State of Utah, the 
description of which is attached hereto as Exhibits "A," "B" and 
"C" and made a part hereof by reference as if incorporated herein 
in their entirety. 
5. Said written agreements provided that Plaintiffs 
pay to the Defendants a sum of $2,125,000 for said property. 
6. Payment was to be made to an escrow account at 
Cedar Land Title, Inc. in Cedar City, Utah on or before 10:00 
a.m. on December 23, 1983, escrow # 2824. 
7. Plaintiffs informed Defendant, Robert Holt, who war 
acting as agent for himself and the other Defendants, that it 
would be difficult for them to arrange the financing by December 
23, 1983, but that they would make every effort to do so. 
8. Defendant, Robert Holt, stated upon being told of 
potential problems with the short time available to Plaintiffs 
that he was only concerned about getting the money and that extra 
time until January 16, 1984 was no problem. 
9. Plaintiffs relied upon Defendant's, Robert Holt's, 
agreement to extend the time the funds must be made available 
until January 16, 1984. 
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10. Plaintiffs promised to the said Defendant, Holt, 
to pay an additional sum to cover purchase of irriqation pevots 
and other costs in the amount of approximately $150,000.00. 
11. Defendant, Holt, agreed to accept said total sum 
of $2,275.00 if paid, (or in escrow), by January 16, 1984. 
12. Defendants should be required to specifically 
perforin the said agreement to sell said property to Plaintiffs by 
the 16th day of January, 1984. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
13. The allegations of paragraph 1 through 12 are 
hereby realleged and incorporated herein by reference. 
14. Defendant, Holt, represented to Plaintiffs, to 
real estate brokers working upon said proposed sale and to title 
company officers involved in the escrow of said transaction that 
he would accept the funds of the Plaintiffs if paid into escrow 
by January 16, 1984 even though the original due date of December 
23, 1984 was about to or had elapsed; that Plaintiff, in reliance 
upon said representations expended sums in excess of $150,000 to 
obtain the financing in order to purchase said property. 
15. The Defendants should be estopped from refusing to 
sell said property to Plaintiffs if the purchase price as 
modified is placed in escrow by Janaury 16, 1984. 
16. That if the Defendants fail to perform their 
agreement to sell said property to Plaintiffs on or before 
January 16, 1984, Plaintiffs will lose the benefit of their 
bargain and will, suffer damages in excess of $2,000,000, the 
exact amount of which will be proved at trial. 
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WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray judgment on their first and 
second causes of action as follows: 
1. Defendants should be ordered to sell said property 
to Plaintiffs for the sum of $2,275,000.00. 
2. In the event Defendants are not ordered to sell 
said property to Plaintiffs as prayed for herein, Plaintiffs 
should be awarded their damages in the amount to be proved at 
trial. 
3. For costs of court. 
4. For such other relief as to the court may appear 
proper. / 
day of ^dUtild* 
jfjt 
Dated this ^ y- , 1984. 
ATKIN, WFIGHT and MILES 
1ue m jy/MacAPTHUP WFIGHT, Attorney 
Wr the Plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs' Address: 
905 Three Fountains 
Cedar City, UT 84720 
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:'rTOWNSHlP 3V OW ill. RANCC 16 WEST, SALT LAKE -- AND MERIDIAN: 
SECTION 1: The South half of the Southeasi Quarter; and the Southeast Quarter 'tt 
of the Southwest Quarter; S •yj'-'f 
SECTION 3: Lotu 13 to 24, inclur.ivr; the Sou then at Quarter and tha North haif^ 
of the Sovithwcst Quarter; 
SECTION 10;. The Northeast Quarter; 
SECTION Ji: All 
SECTION 12: All 
TOWNSHIP 36 SOUTH, RANCC 15 WEST, SALT IAKC UASE AND MERIDIAN: :'lv *'f#iS 
* > ,&M 
SECTION 7: Lots 9, 10, 11 and 12: ^ ^iv/fl 
Deglnning a t the Northwest corner of Lot 8 and running thenct 'i/$\i& 
East 305 f e e t ; South 65*44' East 2061.0 f e e t ; South 268.0 f ee t J *\}~Wk 
West 2640.0 f e e t ; North 1320.0 fiscc to the po in t of beginning. -,K^W 
, '.t'"^ ^* ^  
Beginning a-t the Southwest corner of Lot 4, and running thenct North 
360 feet; South 65'44' Kast 875 feet; Went 799.0 feat to the point o: 
beginning. >J , \r.\\Wfj& 
LXCF.PTINC THEREFROM, that portion lying within tha bounda of .tht;'$k 
State Koad right-of-way. '\r%\\. •!-'g 
SECTIONS 9 and 16: 
! :i * 
Commencing a t the Northwest co rne r of the SWtSW^ of S . c t ion 9, taid 
township and r ange , and running thence Southeasterly to a point 6.38 
c h a l n j East and 2 .63 cha ins South of the place of beginning; South '£. 
23.50 c h a i n s ; thence S o u t h e a s t e r l y to a po in t 7.85 chains North of $J 
a p o i n t 6.65 c h a i n s West of the Southeast corner of tht NWHNA of 
Sec t ion 16; thence S o u t h e a s t e r l y to a poin t 8.34 chains North of the 
Southeas t co rne r of the SVAtNW^  of Section 16; thenco South 2.9 chain I 
W*st 2.36 c h a i n s ; North 6.08 c h a i n s ; West 5.64 chains; thenct Nor th-
e a s t e r l y 4.94 cha ins to a point 7.12 chain* West and 16.16 chains 
North of the Southeas t co rner of the SWithnA of Sec t ion 16; thtneo Wei 
12.17 c h a i n s ; North 4.44 c h a i n s ; West 1 chain; North 4.0 chains! to j <r 
poin t of bop, Inn ing . ?#lTji' -tit 
I'XCKPTINV. TIIERETROM, t h a t p o r t i o n ly ing w i t h i n the bounds of tht SUI 
Road r i x h t - o f - w a y . 
SECTION 1 3 : Lotu 3 to 12, i n c l u s i v e ; 
.^•m 
EXCEPTING THEREFROM, that portion lying within tha dlstributi 
of the New Castle irrigation Conpany. O 
TOWNSHIP 35 SOUTH, RANCE 16 WEST, SALT U K X UASE AND MERIDIAN; ..'- 1 
SECTION 23: The West 60 acres of Northeast Quarter; and tht East half of 
East half of the Northwest Quarter. 
TOWNSHIP 35 SOUTH, RANCE 15 WEST, SALT UJCE hASE AND H&lDUMt-^fyx!} 
SECTION 7: The Southwest Quarter; *' ' ' '' *'*"*'• 
SECTION 9: The Southeast Quarter; 
l/0t( 
EXCEPTING THEREFROM an undivided 1/8 Interest 
M'l SECTION 10: The South 140 acres of the Southwest Quarttr* 
•I EXCEPTING THEREFROM an undivided 1/8 Inttrtlt iUJjJaLl o i l r i g h t s , ! '••••' ' i 
SECTION 28: Commencing at the Southwest corner of Section 126, aald township And * 
range and running thence East 1<>0 rods; thenco North 160 rods; |thencs 
West 4 rods; thence South 16 rodn; thence Vest 156 rods; thenco South 
144 rods to the point of beginning. ; ••'.'j'-l '••;•'«' 
v.:i« 
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ih a l l tnott'i!'* aiul o t h e r I r r i g a t i o n IMJU I pmcnt, inc lud ing but 
10 Chat r»|»cc tf t e a l ly desc r ibed below; 
Well ») I.OC.U ion I'mnp 






• .••••• ' U 
1
 ^ ••» 
i i > J 
•' ' '. ; I 
, : ''M 
'
:
 •• 1 : . ' . " : ^ • 
XV corm*r Lot 12 
Si»c. 7, T. 3b S f | 
K. 15 W. 
IVorli 'ss 10" Newman 75 HP Ei 
iV • 
vv 
HK corner Lot 0 
Sec. IH. T. "Jo S, 
R. 10 W. 
Inlmston 10" US 100 \U> E lec t 
St co rne r i.oc 6 
Sec . 18, t . 30 S. 
K. 15 W. 
$U\NU\ U t 5, 
Sec . 18, T. JO S. 
K. 15 W. 
Worthlnjjton 10" .US 100 HP Elect 
! • ' : • • • • . , ' • • # $ $ 
' • • • • { v . • • • • ' V ^ 
Wintrocli 10" US 150 UP Elect 
t ' 1*'. 
12 
11 
SWVNE\SW\ of See. 3 , 
T. 36 S . , R. 16 W. 
SW^SF.V.St\, of Sec. 3 , 
T. 36 S . , R. 16 U. 
NKVSW\ of Sec. U 
T. 36 S . . R. 16 W. . 
l.ayne 6 Howler' 12" US 100 HP lit 
' ' •"• 'K-\'%$ 
' ' ^ > 1 , 
. w - ' , . ( V 
• •¥ 
l.nynt! & Bowler T Electric*- ;j>>' 
hryuri Jacki;on ' US 12S IIP Klect 
12- - f. -{H 
SK\SF.\ of Soc. I I , 
T. 30 S . , K. 10 W. 
Vii}%ft 6 F l raccn- CE 100 HP Elect 
l.cfK 12° " V ">• 
:;I-:VNW\, of Sn- . 12, 
T. 36 S . , K. Id W. 
I \osv h Klrr*ten- US SO HP Elect l 
lvr>; 
to SW .^Vl,NWV. of Si-C. 11, 
T. 16 S. , K, 16 W. 
Johnston.10M Newman 200 HP I 
* V-tt. 
•v . , : X 
. • I 
••'.if j . ' : 
.:-v.^ii 
iMf? 
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370) Dunes t i c vis 
H i l l i n g ( 2 . 
of 2250 o n 
9 l»orr.es (1 
Sjrne as 71 -
I r r Igai ion 
1r r igac Ion 
211) I r r i g a t i o n 
212) I r r i g a t i o n 
372) I r r i g a t i o n 
37M) I r r i g a t i o n 
J75) I r r i g a t i o n 
378) I r r i g a t i o n 
-1802) I r r . 
-1395) I r r . 
899) i r r i g a t i o n 
e 4 f a m i l i e s ( 2 . 9 2 . a c r e f e e t ) 
79 acre fenc) and s to , ckvater ing 
M r , 9200 sheep , 250 swlr : a n d -
16.17 acre f r e t ) . V 
1V/0, Mipplcncntal o n l y . : 
hO.OO ; ics , supplemental s t o c k . 
^0.00 a c s , supplemental s t o c k / 
160.00 a c s , supplemental s t o c k . 
HH.90 a c s , supplemental s t o c k , 
20*1.80 a c s , supplemental s t o c k . 
110.70 a c s t supplemental s t o c k . 
186,20 a c s , supplemental s t o c k . 
221 .30 a c s , supplementa l s t o c k . 
1 "551.20 a c s , no s t o c k . 
2^0.00 a c s , supplemental s t o c k . 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and correct copies 
of the foregoing Appellant's Brief, postage prepaid, this I S ^ 
day of November, 1985, to the following person: 
Michael D. Hughes 
Thompson, Hughes & Reber 
Attorney for Appelees 
148 East Tabernacle 
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